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Peña-Porras: Denying Swarm Joinder in BitTorrent Cases

JOINDER IS COMING: WHY DENYING SWARM JOINDER IN
BITTORRENT CASES MAY DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD
Gibran J. Peña-Porras*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the seventh season of the TV show Game of Thrones1
(“GOT”) was pirated2 1.03 billion times.3 The true magnitude of this
number may require some context. The premiere of GOT’s seventh
season was viewed by 16.1 million viewers,4 either on its broadcasting
television network or through the network’s on-demand online
platform.5 This high viewership broke records among the network’s TV
shows as “the most-watched season premiere for any HBO series” up to
that date.6 The quantified popularity of that particular episode translated
ten-fold onto piracy statistics, as the episode was illegally downloaded
or streamed more than ten times the number of viewers it had during its
airing.7 This trend was consistent throughout the show’s season, and the
season’s finale was pirated more than 120 million times within three
days of its airing.8
The illegal download of protected works is not a problem exclusive to
television. The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)
estimates that in the ten years that followed the creation of the peer-topeer (“P2P”) file-sharing site Napster in 1999, “music sales in the U.S.
[] dropped 47 percent, from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion.”9 This practice

*I want to thank my family for their endless support, my mentors for their patience and
guidance, and the University of Cincinnati Law Review for their vote of confidence.
1. A fantasy-drama television series adapted from George R. R. Martin’s series of novels titled
A Song of Ice and Fire.
2. By “pirated” the author means illegally downloaded, distributed, copied, or streamed. This
Article will refer to those who engage (or allegedly engage) in piracy, as “pirates.”
3. Travis M. Andrews, “Game of Thrones” Was Pirated More Than A Billion Times, THE
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/09/08/game-of-thrones-was-pirated-more-than-a-billion-times-far-more-than-it-waswatched-legally/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fbc9b81a951c [https://perma.cc/6WXY-43D9].
4. Id.
5. The show is broadcasted through HBO’s network and is also available through HBO’s
streaming platforms “HBO Go” and “HBO Now.”
6. Joe Otterson, “Game of Thrones” Season 7 Premiere Shatters HBO Rating Records,
VARIETY (July 17, 2017, 1:04 PM), http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/game-of-thrones-season-7premiere-ratings-1202497751/ [https://perma.cc/F97F-A36R].
7. Andrews, supra note 3 (The premiere of the season was downloaded 187.4 million times).
8. Id.
9. Why Does the RIAA Hate Torrent Sites So Much?, MUSIC BUS. WORLWIDE (Dec. 6, 2014),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/why-does-the-riaa-hate-torrent-sites-so-much/
[https://perma.cc/Z38Y-SGTG].
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has also been a hard hit to the “big screen.”10 A study in 2016, estimates
that a $1.3 billion loss of potential box-office revenue every year can be
attributed to piracy.11
Evidently, these piracy statistics and their impact on the entertainment
industry are the symptom of a much larger problem. Copyrighted works
of music, films, TV shows, books, magazines, and software applications
are currently being downloaded and uploaded through P2P protocols by
the thousands, as the global file-sharing12 traffic in 201813 is expected to
be around 6,717 petabytes.14 Despite the high number of protected
materials being shared (through file-sharing), the creators do not realize
the benefit of this vast consumption of their works. The damage done to
the authors of these protected works is one of opportunity cost.
Consumption of their works increases while revenue becomes
stagnant—effectively decreasing the value of the work. Nonetheless,
this loss is akin to proving a negative: how can the author be hurt by the
free distribution of a protected work if the author never had possession
of the benefit of selling the work? Some commentators—those that are
willing to admit that piracy does some damage—go as far as stating that
the copyright holder’s actual loss to piracy is not that bad.15 Efforts to
eradicate the piracy problem have yielded little to no results—as actions
against piracy-supporting websites are met with the sprouting of newer
websites that replace those that get taken down—entangling copyright
holders and governmental agencies in a never-ending proverbial game
of “whack-a-mole” with pirates.16 Nevertheless, copyright holders are
10. A term utilized to refer to the cinema industry.
11. Liye Ma et al., The Dual Impact of Movie Piracy on Box-Office Revenue: Cannibalization
and Promotion, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. TEPPER SCH. OF BUS. AND HEINZ COLL. 2 (Feb. 2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2736946 [https://perma.cc/ND2N-QZZK] (“Specifically, our estimates
suggest that box-office revenue would be $1.3b (15%) higher per year if piracy could be eliminated
entirely from the theatrical window and that piracy is particularly damaging to early sales.”).
12. File-sharing is the practice of share electronic files between computers. File-sharing has
become the sought-out method of sharing files, whether protected or otherwise, across the internet. For
more information on how file-sharing works, see Mitchell, infra note 18.
13. See Cisco Systems, Data Volume of Global Consumer File Sharing Traffic from 2016 Until
2021 (in Petabytes per Month), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267182/forecast-forglobal-internet-traffic-through-file-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/J9WD-KJRZ] (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
14. See Tim Fisher, Terabytes, Gigabytes, & Petabytes: How Big are They?, LIFEWIRE.COM
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/terabytes-gigabytes-amp-petabytes-how-big-are-they4125169 [https://perma.cc/34MS-49JG] (A petabyte is a unit of measurement for data. One petabyte is
equal to one million gigabytes).
15. Ernesto Van der Sar, Music Piracy Not That Bad, Industry Says, TORRENTFREAK.COM (Jan.
18,
2009),
https://torrentfreak.com/music-piracy-not-that-bad-industry-says-090118/
[https://perma.cc/V25F-DV2Q] (The argument of the article’s author is based on statements made by
some industry players who have admitted that not every pirated song is a lost sale).
16. Timothy Geigner, The Crackdown on Torrent Sites Has Produced Many More Moles to
Whac,
TECHDIRT.COM
(Sept.
8,
2017,
11:51
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170907/10263638165/crackdown-torrent-sites-has-produced-many-
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not ready to throw in the towel in the fight for the protection of their
rights.
As of late, and with the adoption of the BitTorrent protocol,17 some
copyright holders have hit a brick wall when attempting to get
restitution from defendants who infringe via P2P file-sharing.18 The
collective haul of defendants into court—commonly referred to as a
“swarm joinder”19—has created a split at the federal district court level.
Courts have disagreed over whether copyright holders should be able to
join defendants in swarm joinder fashion or have their complaints
severed, forcing copyright holders to go after each defendant
individually. The crux of this split rests largely on the district courts’
interpretation of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”). At the time of the writing of this Article, only one circuit
court—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—has pitched in
on the discussion, finding swarm joinders to not satisfy the requirements
for permissive joinder under FRCP 20. Several pieces of scholarly
writing can be found weighing in on the discussion as well, with the
majority siding with the courts rejecting swarm joinder.20
This Article respectfully disagrees with the district courts whose
decisions purport to align with the D.C. Circuit’s decision, insofar as
they misapply the Circuit’s precedent and instead use denial of swarm
joinder as a tool to preemptively punish “trolls.”21 Instead, this Article
more-moles-to-whac.shtml [https://perma.cc/5UQB-DJV7].
17. The BitTorrent protocol is a decentralized method of peer-to-peer communication that allows
users to transfer data between each other’s computers. The Author explains how the protocol works later
in this Article.
18. Bradley Mitchell, Understanding P2P File Sharing, LIFEWIRE.COM (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-p2p-818026 [https://perma.cc/KYU8-JHP6] (explaining that
P2P (or peer-to-peer) file sharing refers to the “distribution of digital media over a [decentralized]
network, in which the files are located on individuals’ computer[s] and shared with other members of
the network”).
19. See ME2 Prods. v. Bayu, 2017 WL 5165487 at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2017) (The nature of the
BitTorrent Protocol where users are able “to join ‘swarms’ [which are] cluster[s] of connected
computers where[] users can simultaneously upload to and download from other users”).
20. See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music
Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049 (2008) (claiming that John Doe lawsuits should not allow
permissive joinder because it encroaches on the First Amendment); see also Joshua A. Druckerman, The
Uncertifiable Swarm: Why Defendant Class Actions and Mass BitTorrent Copyright Litigation Don’t
Mix, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 931 (2013/2014) (arguing that swarm joinder claims are inherently flawed
because they raise fairness and due process concerns); but see John C. Heinbockel, The Undiscovered
Country: Fixing Copyright by Rethinking Pretrial Litigation, 5 AM. UNIV. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 152
(2014) (suggesting that swarm joinder can realistically meet the requirements of FRCP 20 and be useful
in deterring infringers but with the use of special masters to assist the judges in determination of
whether claims have merit).
21. See generally Jonathan Bailey, What Is a Copyright Troll?, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2018/04/12/what-is-a-copyright-troll/ [https://perma.cc/M8T9HRZJ] (defining a copyright troll as someone who, while not really interested in exercising copyright
protection rights, uses excessive and aggressive litigation tactics as a source of profit).
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proposes that the courts should allow copyright holders to continue
subpoenaing defendants in swarm joinders—at least through the early
stage of the proceedings—and shift the focus of the debate to ways in
which to prevent the misuse of the defendants’ identification
information obtained as a result of these subpoenas. Part II offers the
reader a background, for context, on the main issues contemplated in
this Article, including a brief primer on Copyright and FRCP 20 as well
as P2P file-sharing and its evolution with the BitTorrent Protocol. Part
III takes a look at some of the earlier case law that deals with swarm
joinders and the road leading up to the D.C. Circuit’s decision. Part IV
summarizes the decisions issued after the D.C. Circuit weighed in, all
the way up to the Cell Film Holdings LLC v. McCray22 decision by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. Lastly, Part V offers a
more detailed discussion of the most common arguments against
allowing swarm joinders. Part V also presents some legal and policy
arguments that support a change in the current course of swarm joinder
cases, in favor of allowing the use of swarm joinder.
II. BACKGROUND
Advances in technology have made possible the easy download of
copyrighted work to personal computers, and with it, a class of cases
referred to as “BitTorrent” cases arose.23 This Part will outline the
relevant information of all the moving pieces in BitTorrent cases, from a
primer on the Copyright statute, FRCP 20 and 21, and the two main filesharing protocols: client-server and peer-to-peer.
A. The Copyright Statute and What It Protects
Article I Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States
provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”24 This clause, known as the copyright clause,25 is the
foundation upon which Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. §102.26
The statute protects works that are fixed in tangible mediums of
expression including several categories of works such as books and
novels, melodies and songs, plays and operas, pictures and sculptures,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624 *
See generally On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, 280 F.R.D. 500 (N. Dist. Cal. 2011).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.02 (2017).
17 U.S.C. § 102.
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movies and other videos, sound recordings, and works of architecture.27
Piracy has reached almost all of these categories in one way or another:
books, novels, songs, scripts, pictures, movies, videos, and sound
recordings can all be found on pirate websites, available for illegal
download, in addition to other protected works such as software and
video games.28
However, not every work that falls within these categories enjoys
copyright protection; there are requirements and caveats to the process.
First, §102(a) has an originality requirement that is fairly easy to meet.29
In order for a work to be considered original under the statute, the work
needs to (1) be the work of its author and not a copy, and (2) possess
some minimal degree of creativity.30
The other requirement under §102 is that the original work must be
“fixed in tangible medium[s] of expression.”31 The definition of a
“tangible medium” is an important one, because a literal interpretation
would leave outside of the statute’s scope those materials reproduced
electronically.32 Although one cannot necessarily touch the code of a
software program, its existence in a hard drive or Compact Disc makes
it so that it is “sufficiently permanent or stable” to be “perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and that provides it with
copyright protection.33
Lastly, copyright protection is only available to the “expression of
[an] idea” and thus, does not extend to facts or to the idea itself. 34 In
summary, an author that has an original work fixated in a tangible
medium is able to obtain protection of the expression in the work, but
not on the idea expressed.
Once protection has been obtained, the copyright holder owns the
exclusive rights to create or authorize the reproduction, derivation,
distribution, performance, display, and transmission of the protected
work.35 However, copyright protection is not absolute, and 17 U.S.C.
§107 provides that, if the work is used in activities that constitute fair
27. Id.
28. For an example of the categories available for download see The Pirate Bay website at
https://thepiratebay.org/browse [https://perma.cc/S5PQ-B8WJ] (last visited on Aug. 25, 2018).
29. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358, (1991) (“[T]he originality
requirement is not particularly stringent”).
30. Id. at 345.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
32. Some examples would include a song reproduced from a computer instead of a physical CD,
a movie played in an electronic device instead of through a DVD, or a piece of software running in a
computer instead of from an installation disk.
33. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added).
34. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 1986).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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use, the copyright holder cannot sue the user, even if the copyright
holder did not grant any license or permission to use the work.36 If the
use does not meet the requirements to constitute fair use, the copyright
is considered infringed and the copyright holder may file a claim for
copyright infringement against the user.37 The remedies available to the
copyright holder under the statute include injunctions to prevent or
restrain the infringement of the copyright,38 impounding of the
infringing works or materials,39 actual damages suffered and the
copyright holder’s profits lost because of the infringement or statutory
damages,40 and costs of court and attorney fees.41 Additionally, under
some specific circumstances, infringers may find themselves subject to
criminal charges for infringement.42
In order to find out if their material is being downloaded illegally,
copyright holders often make use of the same tools that pirates use to
obtain protected works.43 Copyright holders search the name of their
work and, just like any other user, can see the trackers generated through
the BitTorrent client.44 Because the tracker only identifies participants of
the swarm through IP addresses,45 once the copyright holders have
confirmed the illegal download of their work, they often proceed to file
a nameless lawsuit to acquire the identity of the IP addresses’ owners
and to properly name them as defendants.46
B. John Doe Lawsuits and Obtaining the Defendant’s Identity
Claims against defendants engaged in online piracy are known as

36. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (The criteria to determine whether a use qualifies as fair use under the
statute includes: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount
and substantiality of the original work that is used, and the effect on the market for the original work).
37. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501.
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 502.
39. Id. at § 503.
40. Id. at § 504(a).
41. Id. at § 505.
42. Id. at § 506.
43. See How Can a Copyright Holder Find Out If I Have Copyrighted Materials on My
Computer? HARV. UNIV. DCMA https://dmca.harvard.edu/faq/how-can-copyright-holder-find-out-if-ihave-copyrighted-materials-my-computer [https://perma.cc/ZL57-JHSE] (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
44. See Bradley Mitchell, What Is a Bit Torrent Tracker?, LIFEWIRE.COM (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-bit-torrent-tracker-817431 [https://perma.cc/9G96-37UJ].
45. See Chris Hoffman, How Does BitTorrent Work?, HOW-TO GEEK (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://www.howtogeek.com/141257/htg-explains-how-does-bittorrent-work/ [https://perma.cc/Z2YR48AZ].
46. See Cell Film Holdings LLC v. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *5 (D. Nev.
Nov. 29, 2017) (“Because the defendants are initially unidentified, the plaintiff [has to] file[] an ex parte
motion [to obtain] the names and addresses” of the defendants).
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“John Doe” lawsuits.47 A typical John Doe claim generally follows a
standard set of steps. First, the copyright holders file a claim in federal
court against nameless defendants that are generally only identified and
differentiated by their IP address.48 The copyright holders then file a
motion requesting the court to waive the discovery requirements set
forth in Rule 2649 of the FRCP and allow the copyright holders to
subpoena the defendants’ Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) for the
defendants’ identifying information50 pursuant to FRCP 45.51 If the
court grants the motion, the court will subpoena the ISPs for this
information, while allowing the ISPs to notify the defendants about the
request for their information. This gives defendants a chance to protest
the release of their information and contest the subpoena in general.52 In
most of the cases, there is at least one defendant who objects to the
release of the information by raising jurisdiction and joinder issues.
Therefore, once the court receives the defendants’ answers, it
determines whether the copyright holders’ claims should be allowed to
proceed as filed or whether they should be severed to address any
jurisdiction or joinder issues.53
C. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Permissive Joinder
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow plaintiffs and defendants
to be joined in judicial actions, provided that the parties to be joined are
able to meet certain requirements. Because the first provision of FRCP
20(a)(1) deals with the joinder of plaintiffs, 54 this Article will not
address that particular provision. Instead, this Article will focus its
47. See generally Id.
48. See Tim Fisher, What Is an IP Address?, LIFEWIRE.COM (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920 [https://perma.cc/DE6J-A9GK] (An IP
address is “an identifying number for a piece of network hardware [that] allows a device to
communicate with other devices over an IP-based network like the internet”).
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (2015) (Section 26(d) states that discovery may not be sought until the
parties have had a discovery conference as provided by Rule 26(f). The provision also provides for the
timing with which discovery has to be provided; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (2015) (Section 26(f) provides for
the steps and requirements needed to plan and execute discovery).
50. See generally Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340
(D.D.C. 2011) (discussing how other districts have granted motions to subpoena ISPs to compel
production of identifying information of defendants, such as names, addresses, emails, and phone
numbers of the defendants).
51. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
52. See generally Robert G. Larson & Paul A. Godfread, Contemporary Issues in Cyberlaw:
Bringing John Doe to Court, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 328, 339 (Larson and Godfread provide a brief
summary of the steps through which a John Doe claim goes from the filing of the suit through the
defendants’ opposition to the disclosure of their information).
53. See ME2 Prods., 2017 WL 5165487 *8.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).
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analysis of the Rule on provisions 20(a)(2)-(3) and 20(b).
Provision 20(a)(2) establishes that a party “may be joined in one
action as [a] defendant[] if” the party meets both of the provision’s
requirements, which are (1) transactional relationship and (2)
commonality.55 The history behind the Rule, and the case law
interpreting it, agree that the focus of the Rule is to promote the efficient
adjudication of claims and encourage the “joinder of claims, parties and
remedies” whenever its requirements are met.56
The transactional relationship requirement refers to the relationship
that the party to be joined has with an existing defendant, but
specifically in relation to the transaction or occurrence for which that
particular defendant is in court.57 The commonality requirement
provides that a defendant may be joined if “any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action.”58 Both of these
requirements must be met in order for a party to be joined as a
defendant. Provision 20(a)(3) simply states that “a defendant need [not]
be . . . defending against all the relief demanded[,] [and] [t]he court may
grant judgment . . . against one or more defendants according to their
liabilities.”59
Lastly, provision 20(b) recites the court’s discretion in issuing orders
that protect a party against embarrassment, delay, expense, or other
prejudice that may arise from joinder of a person against whom the party
asserts no claim.60
D. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Misjoinder and
Nonjoinder
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serves a dual purpose
when determining whether joinder is proper. The Rule first states that
the existence of improper joinder—misjoinder—is not a ground for
dismissing an action.61 Additionally, and maybe even more important to
this Article’s discussion, the Rule gives the court the right to add or drop
a party at any time after a party’s motion or in the court’s sole
discretion.62
The inclusion of Sections A, B, C, and D in this Part was meant to get
55. Id. at 20(a)(2).
56. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“[J]oinder of claims, parties
and remedies is strongly encouraged”).
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
58. Id. at 20(a)(2)(B).
59. Id. at 20(a)(3).
60. Id. at 20(b).
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
62. Id.
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the reader up to speed on some basic procedural concepts that will assist
in the reading of this Article. Having dealt with these procedural
concepts, Sections E and F will explore some technical concepts that
will help the reader understand the role that technological advances have
had in file-sharing, and in turn, how file-sharing has shaped piracy
practices.
E. Client-Server vs. Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing
The creation of the Internet and the rapid evolution of technology
created new and more streamlined ways of sharing information. Before
long, a new form of sharing files was created: peer-to-peer or P2P, for
short.63 With the use of software, any person with an internet connection
can join a P2P network and start sharing files with other users in the
network.64 By joining a P2P network, a user—also known as a “peer”—
is able to access files from other peers’ computers and can both
download and contribute files to other peers in the network.65 This
method of sharing files is a shift from the P2P’s predecessor, the clientserver model.66 In the file-sharing context, the client-server model works
by creating a direct connection between two computers in order to
initiate the sharing of a file. For instance, instead of joining a network,
person A connects to person B directly and person A’s copy of a
particular song can easily be directly shared with person B. While the
client-server model still has its uses, the P2P model solved some of the
client-server model’s issues, such as transfer speed and efficiency.67
The client-server model requires a computer to act as the server—the
main computer that regulates the activity within the network—and any
computer that connects to it becomes a client.68 The centralized nature
of this model means that the network is only as fast and as efficient as
the computer acting as the server.69 Although the server can handle more
than one simultaneous connection, the transfer speed from the server to

63. See generally James Bruce, How P2P (Peer to Peer) File Sharing Works, MAKEUSEOF.COM
(Aug.
24,
2012),
https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/p2p-peer-peer-file-sharing-works/
[https://perma.cc/EF3M-DM3L] (P2P is a method of distribution based on a network of users that act as
client and servers simultaneously in order to facilitate the transferring of files).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. By “predecessor” the Author means that the client-server model used to be the standard for
file-sharing purposes before the P2P model was adopted. However, this does not mean that the clientserver model is outdated or has been abandoned. The client-server model is still utilized for other
purposes.
67. See generally Bruce, supra note 63.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the clients is limited by the server’s broadband’s connection speed.70
Much like people sharing a pizza, as the number of simultaneous clients
increases, the transfer speed from the server to each client decreases—
that is, each client gets a smaller piece of the pie.
As technology evolved and “bigger, faster, and better” became a need
rather than a want, the P2P model solved some of the problems that
came with its file-sharing predecessor. By joining a P2P network, each
peer is able to be a client and a server at the same time.71 This meant that
as opposed to the client-server model, a P2P network allowed users to
share each of their resources for the benefit of the network, significantly
increasing the availability of files that can be shared at a given point in
time.72 Using the previous pizza-sharing analogy, every peer that joins
the P2P network is considered to have brought a pizza of his own that
can then be shared with the group. So, in the P2P model, the more users
participating in the network, the more easily available files become—the
more pizza there is for everyone to share. This relationship between
peers abandoned the centralized nature of the client-server model and
decentralized the sharing of files through P2P protocols.73 While many
P2P protocols have come and gone, there is one that revolutionized the
way P2P networks are utilized: the BitTorrent Protocol.
F. The BitTorrent Protocol
The BitTorrent Protocol (“BT Protocol”) upped the ante of P2P
networks by essentially utilizing the benefits of a P2P network and
increasing transfer speed and efficiency. 74 With the benefit of a
decentralized network the BT Protocol transferred larger files with a
relatively small impact on transfer speed.75 Large files are broken down
into smaller pieces with unique identifiers that a BitTorrent client—
software that is installed in the user’s computer—keeps track of. Using
these trackers, a peer no longer gets the entire file from a single
computer but instead gets pieces from other peers who have already
downloaded them.76 Once all the pieces have been downloaded, the
BitTorrent client takes all of these pieces and assembles them into a
complete file using the unique piece identifiers, much like pieces of a

70. Id.
71. Bruce, supra note 63.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally Chris Woodford, How Does BitTorrent Work? EXPLAINTHATSTUFF! (Oct. 22,
2017), http://www.explainthatstuff.com/howbittorrentworks.html [https://perma.cc/2NXX-DWHC].
75. Id.
76. Id.
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puzzle.77 Because each peer acts as a server and a client
simultaneously—downloading the file from others and making it
available for newer peers—as a peer successfully downloads a piece of
the file, other peers are able to download that particular piece from him
or her.78
The BT Protocol has not only contributed to the availability of files
but also effectively increased their transfer speeds.79 Additionally, due to
its decentralized nature, the lack of a main server took away most of the
accountability for its use or misuse.80 It is precisely its misuse potential
that made the BT Protocol so attractive to pirates, since the lack of a
main server means that they are able to download files from other peers
and if one peer gets “taken down” the others can continue to share the
files.81 While the BT Protocol is used to share all kinds of files, legally
and illegally, it is the latter that accounts for most of its use.82
III. BITTORRENT CASE LAW
The increase in popularity of P2P networks and the BT Protocol
allows users to share files with a speed and volume that exceed any
foreseeable expectations. This Part explores the copyright holders’
continuous fight to exercise their rights against users sharing protected
works using P2P networks: from the RIAA series of lawsuits in the early
2000s and up until the latest BitTorrent case adjudicated by the District
Court for the District of Nevada.
A. The RIAA Picks a Fight with P2P File-Sharers
In September of 2003, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) filed copyright infringement suits against more than
200 individual defendants83 for engaging in P2P file-sharing of
copyrighted songs.84 While the move was technically unprecedented85
77. Bruce, supra note 63.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Johan Pouwelse, The BitTorrent P2P File-Sharing System, THE REGISTER
(Dec.
18,
2004),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/18/bittorrent_measurements_analysis/
[https://perma.cc/QST6-RAMG].
81. Bruce, supra note 63.
82. Id.
83. Various news articles reporting on the lawsuits concur that the initial number of suits was
261. While the actual complaints are not available to the public, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has a
sample
redacted
copy
available
at
https://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/sample_riaa_complaint.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170206224925/https://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/sample_riaa_complaint.pdf].
84. See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 30,
2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later [https://perma.cc/QV2H-FXKF]; see also
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and it seemed counterintuitive for the organization to be suing its
customers, the RIAA explained that it was the beginning of a movement
that they hope would get P2P users to stop “offering [and sharing] music
that does not belong to them.”86 This initial round of lawsuits had a
shocking effect, mainly because it found target on some unsuspecting
defendants.87 Nonetheless, this did not slow down the RIAA’s resolve
and more lawsuits would later be added to the initial 261 defendants. 88 It
seemed as though the RIAA would not rest until it accomplished its
mission, and the RIAA remained unapologetic throughout the process.89
Although the RIAA ultimately lost the war90 by the time the RIAA
stopped pursuing individual defendants,91 the number of lawsuits had
reached somewhere over 30,000.92 In the end, the RIAA was at least

David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED (May 18, 2010),
https://www.wired.com/2010/05/riaa-bump/ [https://perma.cc/CHC2-UJN5].
85. See RIAA Brings Attack to Customers, Sues College Students, THE MAC OBSERVER (Apr. 3,
2003),
https://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/RIAA_Brings_Attack_To_Customers_Sues_College_Student
s [https://perma.cc/F3RG-TQYS] (The RIAA had already sued four college students a few months
alleging that the students were “operating a sophisticated network designed to enable widespread music
thievery”).
86. See John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET (Sept. 8, 2003),
https://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-sues-261-file-swappers/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160803022942/https://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-sues-261-fileswappers/].
87. See Music Firms Target 12-Year-Old, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3096340.stm [https://perma.cc/K279-PKAU] (One of the initial
261 defendants, 12 year-old Brianna LaHara, ended up settling for $2,000); see also RIAA Sues
Deceased Grandmother, GEEK.COM (Feb. 8, 2005), https://www.geek.com/law/riaa-sues-deceasedgrandmother-558332/ [https://perma.cc/TLB7-B8J8] (In 2005 the RIAA lawsuit reached Gertrude
Walton, who had been deceased for some time).
88. See Jay Lyman, RIAA Sues More P2P Users, TECHNEWSWORLD (Dec. 4, 2003),
https://www.technewsworld.com/story/32308.html [https://perma.cc/89Q5-HHKP] (The RIAA sued
another 41 defendants in late 2003); see also Associated Press, RIAA Sues 532 Alleged Music Swappers,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4018675/ns/technology_and_sciencegames/t/riaa-sues-alleged-music-swappers/#.Ws2Omr3waiY [https://perma.cc/JU3B-7X3B] (Another
round of 532 defendants were sued by the RIAA in January 2004; see also RIAA v. The People, supra
note 84 (In 2007 the RIAA would broaden its focus and start targeting schools as well).
89. See RIAA v. The People, supra note 84 (When the lawsuit found another absurd target in an
elder grandmother for allegedly downloading hard-core rap using a piece of software that was
incompatible with her computer, the RIAA stated that “[w]hen you go fishing with a driftnet, sometimes
you catch a dolphin”).
90. See David Silverman, Why the Recording Industry Really Stopped Suing Its Customers,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 22, 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing
[https://perma.cc/WF76-ZHSZ] (The high costs of keeping up the large number of individual lawsuits
led the RIAA to eventually drop the individual suits tactic in its war against copyright infringement).
91. See James Dye, Who’s Walking the Plank?: The Recording Industry’s Fight to Stop Music
Piracy, 6 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 5 (1964) (Dye offers that the campaign, with 261 initial complaints
was a “shining example[] of judicial inefficiency given the similarity of the claims and the actions” that
brought about the lawsuits).
92. See Eliot Van Buskirk, RIAA to Stop Suing Music Fans, Cut Them Off Instead, WIRED (Dec.
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able to spearhead the current practice of copyright infringement notices
provided by ISPs whenever infringing activity is detected.93
The RIAA’s efforts did not end with its suits against individual filesharers, but also broadened its scope to include the companies
developing the software that enabled the infringing. One of the most
popular examples of this is the RIAA’s lawsuit against LimeWire in
2010.94 A federal court found that LimeWire95 was secondarily liable for
encouraging the direct infringement of the plaintiffs’ works 96 and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.97 Following the test applied
by the United States Supreme Court in Grokster,98 the Court found that
LimeWire was aware of the substantial infringement by its users, 99
marketed its software’s capabilities of infringement, 100 and engaged in
efforts to enable and assist with the infringement.101 Although the case
against LimeWire did not include a swarm joinder, it was one of the few
victories that the RIAA had in its long mission to stop P2P file-sharing
and the piracy practices that the model enabled.
B. The Legislature Chimes In
In the aftermath of the RIAA’s attempt to shed light on the illegality
of downloading and sharing protected works, the legislature attempted
to bring some order to the piracy problem that did not slow down, in
spite of the RIAA’s efforts. One example of such attempts was the
introduction of the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”)102 in late 2011.

19, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/12/riaa-says-it-pl/ [https://perma.cc/DD3E-4FNN]; see also
RIAA v. The People, supra note 84.
93. See Van Buskirk, supra note 92.
94. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
95. LimeWire was a file-sharing program that utilized the P2P model and allowed for users to
download copyrighted materials.
96. See Arista at 492 (While Arista Records was the name plaintiff, there were over a dozen
major recording companies including BMG Music, Capitol Records, Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc.,
Warner Bros Records Inc., Sony Corporation of America, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and the
Recording Industry Association of America.)
97. Id. at 524.
98. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (Stating that in order to
determine whether the defendant intended to entice its customers to violate the copyright of the plaintiff,
three factors needed to be analyzed: (1) whether the defendant’s purpose was to supply the demand for
copyright infringers, as supported by its marketing efforts; (2) whether the defendant made efforts to
create filter or mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity through use of its software; and (3)
whether the infringing activity was of financial value to the defendant).
99. Arista at 510.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 511.
102. House Bill H.R.3261, widely known as the Stop Online Piracy Act or SOPA, available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3261 [https://perma.cc/7XHA-SSUN].
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While SOPA’s objective was to give copyright holders some recourse
against pirate sites whose servers were overseas (and outside U.S.
jurisdiction), the protocols introduced by the bill put virtually any
Internet website at risk of censorship.103 The “Internet community”104
rallied hard against the enactment of SOPA and its Senate counterpart
PIPA,105 encouraging website owners to “blackout” their websites and
culminating in the indefinite shelving of both bills. 106 However, it is
unlikely that the legislature will completely abandon its efforts to come
up with laws that provide recourse for copyright holders, given the
threat that piracy poses to commercial parties of all industries.107
C. The Courts Pick It Up from There
After the legislature failed to enact SOPA and PIPA—laws seeking to
prevent the propagation of piracy—there have been no significant
subsequent bills introduced. However, pirates wait for no one, and the
courts have been responsible for picking up the slack left by the failed
bills. To do this, courts have resorted to the usual suspects, including the
FRCP and case law.
Before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia weighed in
on the properness of swarm joinder in AF Holdings,108 the district
courts’ opinions were more or less evenly distributed, yet still favored
the rejection of its use.109 The District Court for the Northern District of
California is a good example of this ambivalence. In May of 2011, it
denied a plaintiff’s motion to join almost 2,100 defendants in one

103. For a good introduction to how SOPA was supposed to work, see
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained/index.htm [https://perma.cc/JF29-PAST].
104. See Julianne Pepitone, SOPA and PIPA Protest Hits the Streets in New York, CNN MONEY
(Jan.
18,
2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/18/technology/sopa_protest/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/A9G6-RSC7] (Thousands of Internet users in different cities around the United States
supported by important figures in the “Silicon Valley” scene such as Caterina Fake, co-founder of
Flickr, and representatives from Mozilla, Google, Wikipedia, and Reddit).
105. Senate bill S.968 commonly known as the Protect IP Act or PIPA available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/968 [https://perma.cc/89H3-2UG3].
106. More information on the movement can be found at http://www.sopastrike.com/
[https://perma.cc/93BN-8XE8].
107. See Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming, an Analysis of Extortive Pornographic
“Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventative Approaches, 30 Ent. & Sports Law. 1, 1 (2014) (Rosen rightly
points out that even the pornography industry, being so powerful, is worried about the availability of
free pornography material).
108. AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 752 F.3d 990 (2014).
109. See Stefan Mentzer & Michael La Marca, Joinder and Early Discovery in BitTorrent
Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 89, 116 (2015) (Mentzer and La
Marca provide a very useful comparison table of district court decisions from 2011 through 2014).
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action.110 Later that year, the Court allowed the plaintiff to join 18
defendants111 and it stated that, as opposed to other cases, the plaintiff
here was attempting to join “only 18 Doe Defendants – not hundreds or
thousands.”112 Just one month after, the Court denied another joinder
motion, but in this case it did so because it found that the plaintiffs did
not provide enough evidence that the requirements for FRCP 20 had
been met.113 Later that year, in August of 2011, the Court once more
found swarm joinder impermissible for not meeting FRCP 20
requirements.114 Nonetheless, a couple of months after that decision, the
Court allowed a plaintiff to join 39 defendants.115 However, the Court
rested its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had provided supporting
documentation that was specific enough to determine that “the 39 Doe
Defendants [] were part of the same swarm[]” and, as such, met the
transactional requirement of FRCP 20.116
Contrasting the California decisions, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois initially consistently allowed the swarm
joinder of defendants.117 In a case decided in 2012, the Court took a
slightly different view from the previous ones and added some
qualifications to its ruling.118 Although it also allowed joinder, it
informed the plaintiffs that they would only be able to communicate
with the defendants through counsel and not directly. 119 Additionally,
and recognizing the emergence of “trolling” tactics,120 the Court allowed
defendants to continue to use pseudonyms at least through the discovery
phase to prevent any embarrassment or other tactics that may lead to
coercion.121
110. See Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1-2099, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
May 31, 2011).
111. See MCGIP, LLC v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64188, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011).
112. Id.
113. See Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73837, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 8,
2011).
114. See Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[T]here is no evidence to suggest that each of the addresses acted in concert with all of the others.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
115. See OpenMind Sols., Inc. v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7,
2011).
116. Id.
117. See Mgcip v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61879 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2011) (allowing joinder at
least during the initial phase of the case, stating that the issue of improper joinder was premature); see
also First Time Videos, LLC v. Doe, 276 F.R.D. 241 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same); see also First Time
Videos, LLC v. Does 1-76, 276 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same).
118. See generally Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Doe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121368 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
27, 2012).
119. Id. at *14.
120. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (2015).
121. See Sunlust Pictures, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121368 at *15.
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IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN AND CELL FILM HOLDINGS
Just like the California and Illinois courts, other districts have issued
different decisions regarding the properness of swarm joinder. Some
courts have found in favor and some against swarm joinder; some
decisions were based on number of defendants the plaintiffs wanted to
join and some others were based on meeting—or failing to meet—the
requirements of FRCP 20.122 Before long, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia became the first—and at the time of this Article’s
writing, the only—Circuit Court to weigh in on the issue.123 In the years
leading up to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, District Courts in the District
of Columbia had consistently allowed joinder124 with the exception of a
case in 2012.125
The D.C. Circuit Court tackled the issue by providing a background
on the parties involved, paying special attention to the plaintiff. 126
Explaining the background and methodology of the plaintiff’s lawsuit,
the court stated that the lawsuit was “a quintessential example” of the
modus operandi of plaintiffs who sue only to be able to coerce
defendants to settle instead of to exercise their protection rights.127
Speaking to jurisdiction concerns, the Court stated that the plaintiff had
“made absolutely no effort to limit its suit . . . to those defendants who
might live or have downloaded [the protected work] in the District of
Columbia.”128 Addressing the issue of joinder, the Court stated that the
plaintiff had “provided no reason to think that the Doe defendants” had

122. See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55413 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013)
(denying joinder because plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to prove the required logic relationship
between the defendants to support joinder); see also Combat Zone, Inc. v. Doe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35439 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (although the court refused to determine whether joinder was proper
under FRCP 20, it exercised its discretion under FRCP 20(b) to sever all defendants but one); but see
Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011) (finding
joinder was proper at that stage of the litigation because the requirements were met by the plaintiff); see
also Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 286 F.R.D. 160 (D. Mass. 2012) (also finding joinder proper at the
early stage of litigation but preserving the defendants’ right to revisit the issue of improper joinder at a
later time).
123. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 990.
124. See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011); see
also Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Doe, 810 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2011); see also W. Coast Prods. v.
Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
125. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 286 F.R.D. 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding joinder improper for
not meeting the FRCP 20 requirements).
126. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 992 (2014) (The court explained that AF Holdings was attorney
Paul A. Duffy who was associated with Prenda Law. The court when ahead and stated that Prenda Law
was a “porno-trolling collective[]” that acquired copyrights to pornographic movies only to initiate
massive John Doe copyright infringement lawsuits).
127. Id. at 993.
128. Id. at 996.
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been part of the same “swarm” at the same time129 but rather only
provided snapshots of the defendants’ activities spanning a period of
five months.130 The Court found this supporting evidence and timeframe
to be far too removed to be able to link the defendants as required by
FRCP 20.131
In the years following the AF Holdings decision, the balance of
district court decisions supporting and opposing joinder has skewed
severely towards severing defendants and denying joinder. With a few
exceptions,132 most district courts now fall within the large majority
denying joinder due to either lack of efficiency, 133 failure to meet FRCP
20 requirements,134 or inconvenience and prejudice that can result from
joining multiple defendants.135
At the time of the inception of this Article, the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada decision in Cell Film Holdings LLC v.
Acosta136 was the latest decision addressing swarm joinder to be fully
adjudicated.137 However, while this Article was being written, the
District Court for the Western District of Washington issued an opinion
on the matter in POW Nev., LLC v. Doe.138 In POW, twelve defendants
were sued for using the BT Protocol to download the plaintiff’s movie
“Revolt.”139 The plaintiff argued that the defendants should be joined in
a swarm because they resided in the same district and downloaded the
protected work within the same period of time.140
129. Id. at 998.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See e.g. Cell Film Holdings, LLC v. Does, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180445, at *11 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 29, 2016); and Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5623 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2016)
(in both cases, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed joinder).
133. See ME2 Prods. v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163319, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2016)
(“Because joinder in this case would not result in judicial economy, the Court exercises its discretion to
sever the claims against each Defendant.”).
134. See Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Doe, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160665, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1,
2015) (“that the defendants all used the same file sharing network . . . are analogous to the previous P2P
actions where courts found such allegations insufficient to sustain permissive joinder.”).
135. See Cell Film Holdings, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180445, at *11 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2016)
(“Like others, this Court becomes wary of inefficient, unmanageable, and potentially prejudicial joinder
of multiple defendants.”).
136. See Cell Film Holdings LLC v. Acosta, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 (D. Nev. Nov. 29,
2017) (This case is one of three identical cases that were filed by the plaintiff Cell Film Holdings
(CFH). These cases were CFH v. Acosta, CFH v. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, and CFH v.
Galang U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195858 (D. Nev., Nov. 29, 2017)).
137. There was another decision in March 2018 but the determination of joinder properness was
left for another time. See Venice PI, LLC v. Doe, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53842 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30,
2018).
138. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2018).
139. See POW Nev., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708 at *3.
140. Id.
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Following the lead of the D.C. Circuit and the Nevada District court,
the Washington District court also denied joinder for the plaintiff,
saying that the FRCP 20 requirements were not met and that even if the
requirements had been met, the plaintiff had “fail[ed] to comport with
the principles of fundamental fairness.”141 For the most part, the POW
Court echoed the arguments provided by the Nevada District and the
D.C. Circuit courts, along with those other districts that had similarly
denied joinder on similar grounds.142
Although POW was decided after the Cell Film Holdings decision,
this Article will briefly discuss the Cell Film Holdings decision as
cementing the precedent that the D.C. Circuit set, and that POW would
later follow.
The Cell Film Holdings Court began its analysis of the properness of
swarm joinder by briefly acknowledging the authority split on the
issue.143 The Court eloquently said that the split among the districts—
and only touched by the D.C. Circuit at the appellate level—reflected
how the only thing that was clear was that “there is no uniform
protocol.”144 Immediately after, the Court stepped out of a stance it had
taken in the past, declining to address the properness of swarm
joinder,145 and decidedly joined “those courts that hold that [FRCP 20]
does not permit swarm joinder.”146 The Court proceeded to analyze the
transactional requirement of FRCP 20 and concluded that none of the
data provided by the plaintiffs suggested that the defendants had “acted
in concert as part of the same transaction or occurrence.”147 Therefore,
the Court severed the claims of all of the defendants without prejudice,
with the exception of one defendant.148 The remainder of the Court’s
decision was spent on the only defendant that was not severed from the
lawsuit.
V. DISCUSSION
The Cell Film Holdings and the D.C. Circuit’s decisions have
undoubtedly influenced the decisions that have come after them.
Nonetheless, more nuanced decisions, such as those made by the
141. Id. at *5.
142. See generally Id.
143. See Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *7.
144. Id. at *8.
145. See LHF Prods. v. Smith, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (The
court had declined to address whether FRCP 20 allowed swarm joinder in a previous case concluding
that joinder was permissibly improper rather than improper for failure to meet FRCP 20 requirements).
146. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *9.
147. Id. at *11.
148. Id. at *11-12.
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Northern District of Illinois, have kept the split alive and provide ripe
timing for an in-depth discussion about the properness of swarm joinder
in BitTorrent cases. The vast majority of district courts have found in
FRCP 20 a way to keep copyright infringement claims in a relatively
simple setting: one-on-one. These courts mainly argue that, by doing
this, “trolls” are discouraged. While “trolling” practices are undoubtedly
troubling, this Article suggests that precluding swarm joinder is not the
best way to address the issue. This point of view, while certainly not a
popular one, seeks to contrast the increasingly common cynicism with
which plaintiffs in BitTorrent cases are met.149 While district courts have
grounded their denials of swarm joinder quoting other districts and the
D.C. Circuit as persuasive authority, in some cases they resort to siding
with other courts without engaging in the analysis that the D.C. Circuit
engaged in. In other cases where the courts indeed follow the D.C.
Circuit’s analysis, the courts use FRCP 21 as an escape hatch to justify
the denial of joinder, even if unwarranted.150
There is certainly a small number of scholarly writings in support of
swarm joinder that provide some good arguments,151 and others that
offer sensible approaches to the issue while not necessarily taking a
stand.152 Nevertheless, the Cell Film Holdings decision did not care to
address any of these proposed arguments and instead focused on the
majority’s view.153 The repercussion of this decision—as evidenced by
the subsequent POW decision—calls for another look at the arguments
in favor of swarm joinder. This Part will present these arguments in two
sections, first looking at permissibility of swarm joinder as a matter of
law and then at desirability of swarm joinder as a matter of policy. The
latter section will also look at other arguments that have been presented
in opposition of swarm joinder and discuss the reasons why they are
flawed or, in some cases, obsolete.

149. See generally Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 10, 2012 WL 5382304 (C.D. Cal.
June 27, 2012).
150. Compare LHF Prods. v. Smith, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, *8 (D. Nev. October 23,
2017) (Denying to engage in FRCP 20 analysis and grounding its decision on FRCP 21 instead) with
ME2 Prods., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184021, at *12-13 (Ruling that even if the defendant had indeed
met the requirements of FRCP 20, permissive joinder was more of a burden on the defendants than on
the plaintiff).
151. See John C. Heinbockel, The Undiscovered Country: Fixing Copyright By Rethinking
Pretrial Litigation, 5 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 152 (2014).
152. See Morgan E. Pietz, Copyright Court: A New Approach to Recapturing Revenue Lost to
Infringement, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (2017).
153. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 (The opinion is indeed very short. The
court acknowledges the position of other districts but does not mention any of the arguments they offer
to support permissive joinder in BitTorrent cases).
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A. Joinder Should Be Permitted as A Matter of Law
Because a swarm joinder meets the statutory requirements under
FRCP 20, the “fundamental fairness” factors, and does not affect the
courts’ powers under FRCP 21, courts can and should allow plaintiffs to
join defendants as part of a swarm, if they are reasonably related
geographically and in time.
1. Swarm Joinder Meets the Requirements of FRCP 20
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for plaintiffs
and defendants to be joined in judicial actions, provided that the parties
to be joined meet two requirements: transactional relationship and
commonality.154 Swarm joinder meets both requirements under the Rule
and should be allowed, at least during the initial stages of the litigation,
to let the plaintiff get the necessary identity information to properly
name the defendants.
The transactional relationship requirement asks for the party sought to
be joined to be liable to the plaintiff for relief “with respect to or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences[.]”155 Some courts have interpreted the Rule’s language too
narrowly, sometimes stating that because the defendants did not know
each other, their actions could not be part of a transactional
relationship.156 However, the Rule’s use of the word “or” indicates that
its correct interpretation should be much broader. Namely, that a
plaintiff’s right against a defendant must arise out of either the same
transaction, or the same occurrence, or the same series of transactions or
the same series of occurrences. A user that is part of the same BitTorrent
swarm would definitely fall within this broad interpretation of the
language.
This broader interpretation calls for allowing swarm joinder in
BitTorrent cases. The very nature of the BT Protocol is the biggest
reason for allowing swarm joinder. The client-server protocol required
User A to act as a server, allowing other users to be User A’s clients and
download files made available by User A. Once these users had obtained
the files, they themselves would become servers by way of having files
in their shared folder for other users to download. In this protocol, it

154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
155. Id.
156. See Hard Drive, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (grounding part of its decision in the lack of
evidence suggesting that each of the defendants had “acted in concert” with each other while illegally
downloading the protected works).
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made sense that in order for two or more users to be transactionally
linked for purposes of FRCP 20, the plaintiff needed to prove that at any
given point in time defendant 1 was (as a server) providing defendant 2
(as a client) with a file to download. A plaintiff then would be able to
prove that defendants 1 and 2 were part of the same transaction.
However, the BT Protocol turned this relationship on its head and
made it so that defendants 1 and 2 are each other’s client and server at
the same time while simultaneously allowing defendants 3 and 4 to join
in as clients and servers as well; and so on, and so on. Admittedly, some
decisions have raised valid points expressing the difficulty of justifying
a broader interpretation of a “same transaction” when the plaintiff is
joining several defendants from all over the country.157 However, while
in earlier cases plaintiffs were attempting to join dozens, hundreds, or
sometimes thousands of defendants, plaintiffs in recent cases have
driven this number down to manageable numbers.158 Similarly, plaintiffs
in recent cases have learned from previous decisions and have limited
the timeframe in which they focus, seeking joinder of defendants that
have interacted with the BitTorrent software over shorter periods of
time.159
The Cell Film Holdings Court, in justifying its decision, referred to an
analogy that the D.C. Circuit used illustrating why FRCP 20 does not
permit swarm joinder. In short, the D.C. Circuit said that two BitTorrent
users who downloaded the same file at different times were like two
individuals who played at the same blackjack table at different times.
The Court offered: “[while the defendants] may have won the same
amount of money . . . and perhaps even played with the same dealer, []
they still engaged in entirely separate transactions.”160
This analogy may have worked in a client-server protocol scenario
where defendants 2 and 3 needed to be downloading the file from
defendant 1 at the same time, so as to be sitting at the same proverbial
blackjack table. The problem with this analogy, however, is that it does
not hold true against the reality of BitTorrent swarms. The analogy
ignores that in a BitTorrent swarm—at least when it comes to

157. See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (Plaintiffs were trying to join 1,062
unnamed defendants to the lawsuit); see also AF Holdings, 752 F.3d 990 at 994 (Plaintiff was trying to
join 1,058 defendants, without evidence supporting that they had minimum contacts with the District of
Columbia).
158. E.g. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *4 (Plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit seeking to
join 16 defendants, later amended their claim reducing the number to 12, and ending with a motion to
join only 3 defendants); see also LHF Prods. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *5 (Plaintiffs brought
an initial claim against 21 defendants, reducing it to 17, and ending with only 4).
159. E.g. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *11 (Plaintiffs had selected defendants
within a time span of only 6 days).
160. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *11 (citing AF Holdings).
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defendants that participated in a swarm within a short span of time—
users are each other’s dealers, and one cannot play blackjack without a
dealer. As more users join the swarm, the likelihood (and speed) of a
successful download increases. The reality is that when defendants
participate in a swarm that is connected in time, they all have acted as a
blackjack dealer, enabling each other’s ability to play—that is, to obtain
the infringing work. Understanding this important relationship between
members of a swarm can avoid misinterpretations that prejudice the
plaintiffs seeking swarm joinder.161
The second requirement of FRCP 20 is the commonality of questions
of fact or law. BitTorrent cases easily satisfy this requirement in both,
questions of fact and of law. Most (if not all) of these actions relate to
the illegal sharing of a particular work downloaded by all the
defendants, violating the same copyright rights from the same owner.
Permitting plaintiffs to join a reasonable number of defendants as
members of a swarm not only comports with the requirements set under
FRCP 20 but also fall squarely on the efficiency purpose behind the
enactment of the Rule, which includes the promotion of trial
convenience and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
2. Swarm Joinder Comports with the “Fundamental Fairness” Factors.
In assessing the properness of swarm joinder under FRCP 20, courts
have looked at an additional consideration dubbed “fundamental
fairness,”162 which looks at different factors, such as: prejudice that may
result to any of the parties; any delay of the moving party in seeking the
joinder; the motive behind seeking joinder; the relationship between the
new and old parties (similar to the transactional relationship
requirement); whether joinder will affect the court’s jurisdiction; and the
new party’s notice of the pending action.163 These factors can be
succinctly addressed in the context of swarm joinder. While defendants
may not be entirely comfortable being joined as a swarm, plaintiffs can
be severely financially prejudiced if they are forced to pursue each

161. The court in Hard Drive Prods, 809 F. Supp. 2d stated that the six-week span covering the
illegal activity weighed against the plaintiff’s case because it was unlikely that “an alleged infringer []
would patiently wait six weeks to collect the bits of the work” needed to be able to use the work as a
whole. However, the court ignored the fact that users that join a swarm voluntarily decide to remain a
part of the swarm for a period of time, not out of necessity but out of conviction. A user that remains in
a swarm for a period of 6 weeks does so not because the user had to wait 6 weeks to download the
protected work, but because the user decided to continue “seeding” the work (i.e. acting as a server) in
order to allow other users to download it, before leaving the swarm.
162. See Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, *1375, (9th Cir.
Cal. July 25, 1980).
163. Id.
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defendant separately.164 The plaintiffs are responsible for avoiding
delays in seeking joinder and the courts can ensure that the plaintiffs are
prompt in their request and use of discovery. The plaintiffs can exercise
due diligence in selecting which defendants to join to satisfy
transactional relationship requirements—such as geographical and time
proximity—which would, at the same time, take care of any
jurisdictional issues. The motive factor is admittedly a difficult one, but
courts are well equipped to deal with litigation that is determined to be
frivolous, unconscionable, or otherwise improper.
3. Courts Still Retain Discretion under FRCP 21
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants courts the
discretion to join or drop a party “at any time” whether “[o]n motion or
on its own[.]”165 This Rule is entirely independent from FRCP 20 and
does not require the court to look at FRCP 20 in order to exercise its
discretion.
So, while permitting swarm joinder in BitTorrent cases may have
disadvantages due to the risks of frivolous and coercive litigation by
“trolls,” this Article and some courts166 suggest that the potential for
prejudice is outweighed by the potential for efficiency and the fact that
allowing swarm joinder at the outset of a lawsuit does not mean that a
court has waived its rights under FRCP 21. Therefore, a federal court
can allow for a swarm joinder of defendants at the outset and, if at any
time it determines that the plaintiff’s case is not in good faith, the court
can exercise its rights under FRCP 21.
The D.C. Circuit did a great job analyzing the plaintiff’s case and
utilizing the tools available to rule on the properness of joinder in that
case.167 The Court reviewed the requirements of FRCP 20 and
contrasted them against the plaintiff’s claims.168 The Court then noticed
the improperness of the number of defendants that the plaintiffs sought
to join,169 the lack of attention to jurisdictional issues,170 and how these
factors provided a prima facie conclusion that the plaintiffs were

164. At the time of this writing, each filing in federal court costs $350.00. Additionally, the
plaintiffs’ legal fees would be multiplied by the number of defendants that they are suing.
165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
166. See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (Granting swarm joinder at “this stage in
the litigation” even though it reserved its rights as “[t]he defendants may be able to demonstrate
prejudice once the plaintiffs proceed with their cases against them”).
167. See generally AF Holdings, 752 F.3d 990.
168. Id. at 998.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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attempting to engage in trolling.171 The Court did not address FRCP 21,
and instead mentioned that the plaintiffs could have tailored their claims
to have a “reasonable basis for believing that the requirements for
joinder would be satisfied[]” but had not done so.172 By doing this, the
Court implied that the requirements of FRCP 20 are not automatically
wanting in a swarm joinder case, and instead, the claims need to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
B. Joinder Should Be Permitted as a Matter of Policy
Through adjudication of BitTorrent cases, courts have created a
record that contemplates both legal and policy arguments in favor or
against allowing swarm joinder. This subsection will attempt to touch on
some of the most commonly used arguments against the use of swarm
joinder and address them individually. First, this subsection will briefly
address an argument that seeks to minimize the effect and culpability of
piracy. Second, the Article will address the stigma that the RIAA’s
actions created and that weighs on today’s plaintiffs in BitTorrent cases.
Third, the Article will present the argument of the innocent defendant.
Fourth, the Article will briefly address another collateral argument often
raised against swarm joinder. Lastly, the Article will expand on the
concept of trolling, how denying swarm joinder does not fix the trolling
problem and offer alternatives to address trolls.
1. Piracy Is Not That Bad.
Piracy, the violation of copyright holders’ rights, has considerable
public policy implications in society. 173 However, the public opinion
seems to often find ways to justify partaking in piracy practices.
Although it may be uncomfortable to compare the culpability of a pirate
to that of a burglar, the reality is that, in both cases, a crime has been
committed. The tendency to minimize the culpability of piracy is
precisely what triggered the RIAA’s ire, and rightly so. Piracy is often
seen as a victimless crime, but it is no more justifiable than tax evasion.
The fact that a pirate victimizes copyright holders instead of the
government should not automatically grant defendants with undue
leniency. Regrettably, the massive widespread use of the BT Protocol
and compatible software, making piracy a household practice, is not lost
171. Id.
172. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 998.
173. Be it direct impact on the industries to which the pirated works belong, as evidenced by the
examples provided at the beginning of this Article, the availability of quality copyrighted work, or even
the pricing of works of media.
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on this Author. However, if there is ever a time when the legislature
deems widespread practices lawful by virtue of their popularity, piracy
may then be sanctioned. Until then, it is hard to imagine a day when
breaking and entering might become acceptable if enough people do it.
For the time being, plaintiffs should be allowed to make use of swarm
joinder, as it represents one of the few tools they have to try and keep
up.
2. Plaintiffs Are Evil
The Recording Industry Association of America’s crusade was the
first time that an industry giant went after file-sharers for engaging in
piracy practices. At the time, there was a widespread feeling of David
against Goliath. The RIAA was chastised for going against its
customers, most of whom had only downloaded a few songs. To this
argument there are two points this Article urges the reader to consider.
The first one is, since when should it matter that the pirates only
downloaded a few songs? Should the police stop arresting anyone who
only steals a few dollars? Should prosecutors stop going against the con
man that defrauded only a few people? The truth of the matter is that
culpability lies on the action just as much, if not more, than on what the
wrongdoer got out of it.
Second, the stigma that attached to all BitTorrent plaintiffs because of
the actions of the RIAA is unwarranted. For the most part, BitTorrent
plaintiffs then and now are differently situated. The RIAA’s objective
was to prove a point and raise awareness. They wanted to make noise
and make sure people knew that they were coming for the pirates. To
accomplish this, the RIAA was willing to tap into its large proverbial
pockets and file thousands of claims around the country for almost five
years. Plaintiffs nowadays have different objectives and are no longer
RIAA-sized or MPAA-sized companies with deep pockets and a team of
lawyers that can fill up a van. Plaintiffs are now smaller film production
studios that are not seeking to make a statement but rather get restitution
for what they have lost in order to be able to move on to their next
work.174 Not that this last point should matter too much, since the
copyright statute does not concern itself with the size or financial
resources of the copyright holder. Neither of these plaintiffs deserves
less or more protection with respect to the illegal reproduction and
distribution of their work, nor their right to seek restitution for damages
suffered. However, the point still stands: plaintiffs can no longer be
automatically shoved into a stereotypical box of greedy, faceless

174. For examples see generally the plaintiffs in cases supra note 158.
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companies that are out on a hunt, because they do not fit the profile.
Additionally, piracy practices were not as advanced as they are today.
During the RIAA’s crusade, the client-server protocol was the standard.
Nowadays, pirates can download material much easier and faster.
Rejecting the use of swarm joinder when it is proper is to force plaintiffs
to try and keep a sinking ship afloat but only allowing them to bail water
out with a SOLO cup.
Lastly, critics of BitTorrent plaintiffs, will find reasons to condemn
their actions, regardless of whether swarm joinder is at issue. Although
the RIAA sued individuals in their own district to avoid jurisdictional
issues—avoiding the arguments that come with swarm joinder—the
RIAA’s move was still criticized for being a “shining example of
judicial inefficiency” due to the similarity of the claims. 175 Had the
RIAA sought to utilize swarm joinder, it would have most likely been
the target of several of the arguments that criticize its use. A plaintiffaverse mindset does not further the resolution of legal issues, especially
when this mindset forces the plaintiffs to a position where they are
“damned if [they] do [and] damned if [they] don’t.”176
3. The Curious Case of the Innocent Defendant
Critics of swarm joinder bring up time and time again the case of the
innocent defendant. Succinctly put, this argument presents a
hypothetical defendant whose identification information is obtained
through the subpoenas issued by the court, yet this particular defendant
is not the actual infringer. Often times this innocent defendant is
portrayed as either an elderly person or an oblivious internet user whose
lack of technological savvy creates vulnerability for others to use their
wireless internet connection to illegally download pornographic
protected material without the knowledge of the innocent defendant.177
In this scenario, the defenseless lady is caught off guard by the notice of
service and rather than risk being portrayed in the media as a
downloader of pornography, she decides to settle in exchange of being
dropped from the suit.
Supporters of this theory continue to conjure up the image of the
175. See Dye, supra note 91.
176. The idiom “[you are] damned if you do and damned if you don’t” is used to describe
someone who is in a position where there is no favorable result, regardless of their actions. See
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/(you're)%20damned%20if%20you%20do%20and%20damned%20if%20you%2
0don't.
177. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 26 (offering how some of these swarm John Doe claims end up
hailing innocent defendants into court as a result of joining the person that is paying the internet bill as
opposed to the actual infringing user).
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innocent defendant and contrast it with a portrayal of the tough, deeppocketed, greedy, intimidating plaintiff whose only concern is to make
money and does not care who he has to “troll” in order to get it. This
sentiment cannot necessarily be considered unfounded, since the RIAA
did remain unapologetic as its efforts found target in what would be
considered innocent defendants. However, the real contemporaneous
picture is no longer so black and white.
Concerns about “trolls” and “trolling” practices are certainly valid
and—to the extent they portray a realistic picture—very troublesome.
However, they ignore the changes that plaintiffs have made in order to
address the potential risk of joining an innocent defendant and tend to
blur the focus from what is at stake. The practice of “trolling,” as
portrayed by the swarm joinder rejecters, had plaintiffs seeking to join
hundreds and sometimes thousands of defendants at once. Nowadays the
picture is a lot less drastic. Some plaintiffs have taken affirmative steps
and developed criteria to determine which defendants they take to court,
often voluntarily dropping several defendants from the lawsuit.178 While
plaintiffs may still subpoena the identifying information of several
defendants, they often utilize a filtered process to start dropping those
defendants where there may be legitimate concerns about the culpability
of the now identified defendant. This is not only a step in the right
direction, but is also a show of good faith on behalf of the plaintiffs,
demonstrating that their desire for restitution and exercise of their
copyright protection does not mean they will trample over innocent
people nor engage in questionable legal practices.
Additionally, while the innocent grandma paints a very persuasive
image, this Author believes that the innocent defendant theory should be
on its way out, and—no pun intended—be nearing its retirement. In this
day and age, the concept of a technologically illiterate defendant gets
more and more suspect as time goes by. At the time of this writing, the
vast majority of Internet Service Providers set up password-protected
networks by default for their customers.179 The passwords are often a
string of random alphanumerical characters, often printed on the actual
router, that can only be accessed by the members of the household or
visitors. Moreover, the elderly have grown consistently more receptive
178. E.g. LHF Prods., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *4-5 (Plaintiff “identified the 1-2%
most egregious offenders and [sued them] in sets of 10-30 [per claim],” and further filtering according
to the defenses raised by each defendant in an attempt to “impose the least expense on all parties
involved—including the [c]ourt”).
179. Information available for Spectrum (formerly Time Warner Cable) on its website states that
self-install kits come with pre-set passwords by default printed on the router. This information is
available at https://www.spectrum.net/support/internet/self-install-spectrum-internet-and-wifi-service/.
A subsequent conversation with a Spectrum customer service representative confirmed that all Spectrum
installations come with a default Wi-Fi password as well.
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to adopting newer technology, such as smartphones, computers, and
devices that interact with the Internet-of-Things (IoT) protocol. Long
gone are the days where having wireless Internet was something only
for tech-savvy people; nowadays wireless Internet is the standard.
Another factor often conveniently forgotten by objectors to swarm
joinder is the fact that not all settlements arise out of shame, but may
arise out of guilt. And the probability that a defendant is guilty increases
when plaintiffs have already used criteria and filters to narrow down the
number of defendants to be hailed into court. When a settlement is
reached between the plaintiff and a guilty defendant, the settlement acts
as a warranted retribution for the plaintiff and a deterrent for the
defendant. However, when courts have a predisposed plaintiff-averse
mindset and deny swarm joinder at the outset, neither party benefits.
Commentators argue that there is “inherent[] embarrass[ment]”180 in
associating a defendant with the download of porn, which effectively
coerces the defendant to settle, lest the public associate their name with
a pornographer. However, being accused of a crime is never something
a defendant longs for, and a defendant who cares about their public
image will find inherent embarrassment in any criminal trial, regardless
of what the crime is. In the case of a presumably innocent defendant
where the goal is to protect the defendant’s reputation, a plaintiff that
believes a defendant is guilty will sue the defendant either way, so the
reputation is not really protected and unnecessary costs are imposed on
the plaintiff. However, in the case of guilty defendants, the denial of
joinder only allows them to resume downloading pirated material,
effectively asking the plaintiff to choose between exercising its rights or
preserving its financial resources.
Critics of the swarm joinder also ignore that a settlement is not a
measure of guilt or innocence. If, even after the plaintiff has used
selective criteria to narrow the number of defendants and the court has
determined whether the plaintiff’s claim is in good faith, an innocent
defendant is still hailed into court, the copyright statute itself allows for
the courts to make the defendant whole by ordering the plaintiff to cover
the defendant’s legal costs. However, because innocence or guilt is a
determination that is almost impossible to make at the outset, courts
should allow swarm joinder first and then force the plaintiffs to curtail
their case to comport with fair standards, when needed, dropping any
unjustified defendants from their claims.
Allowing swarm joinder may very well impose a burden on
defendants. However, no person inherently desires to be a defendant, or
is a defendant by pure conviction. Reasonable measures can be taken to

180. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 28.
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ensure the fair joinder of defendants and the punishment of abusive
plaintiffs. For instance, consider prank calls to the 911 emergency
services line. Emergency responders do not stop responding to every
call just because the person calling may be a prank caller. Instead,
emergency responders attend every call and punish prank callers
whenever they encounter them. Although innocent defendants need to
be protected from trolls, deforming FRCP 20 in the name of innocent
defendants is not the proper way to do it. Instead, courts should favor
the introduction of defendants to promote judicial efficiency while
keeping safety controls handy for plaintiffs who abuse the system.
4. Another Argument
Critics of swarm joinder have, in numerous times, also raised
collateral arguments while advocating against the properness of swarm
joinder. One of these arguments relates to the privacy of the defendant,
in conjunction with First Amendment rights. Critics say that by
subpoenaing the defendants’ identifying information, their privacy is
invaded181 and that by utilizing the BT Protocol to download protected
work, the defendant is expressing his or her taste and style.182 This
expression, defendants offer, should be entitled to First Amendment
protection. However, courts have already determined that this
compounded argument crumbles for two reasons. First, solid precedent
has already established that an individual’s privacy is fragile and must
give way to an author’s right to claim the protection of copyrighted
work.183 Second, the release of identifying information does not
encroach on the defendants’ First Amendment rights because the release
does not threaten the prosecution of the expression of ideas but only
seeks to identify defendants in order to be properly served.184
5. Slaying Trolls
Courts have often focused their decisions on attempts to eradicate
trolling practices. However, the determination of whether swarm joinder
is proper should be based on the requirements of FRCP 20 and notions
of efficiency, justice, and fairness, and not on tangential issues. This
does not mean that trolling practices should be kept unchecked, but there
are alternatives that courts can use to minimize the damage caused by
trolls, without having to sacrifice one of the very few recourses that
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Rosen, supra note 107 at 27.
See generally Id.
Rosen, supra note 107 at 27.
Id.
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plaintiffs have to enforce their copyright protection rights.
A plaintiff is unreasonably characterized as a troll if the plaintiff is
seeking a settlement. However, the pursuit of a settlement should not be
the deciding factor of whether a plaintiff is a “troll” because judicial
policy itself encourages settlements.185 Moreover, litigation costs for
both parties can run high and a plaintiff is not a “troll” for simply
wanting to avoid unnecessary costs. Instead, the focus should turn to
whether the plaintiff has the intent of taking the case to trial and arguing
it on the merits. If courts permit joinder of carefully selected defendants,
the plaintiff can get one sizable judgment and move on. The alternative,
however, is not as straightforward, but rather burdensome. If a court
denies swarm joinder, the plaintiff is forced to go against twenty
different defendants individually, increasing its costs and decreasing the
chance that it will obtain enough remuneration to justify and offset
them. And, the defendants are still forced to go through the costly hassle
of trial and risk ending up with a judgment that can certainly ruin their
financial future.
While it is true that “trolling” is a disreputable practice, it is important
for courts to remain focused on the matter at hand and not adopt a
presumption of evil motives against all plaintiffs.186 The American
judicial system already has a presumption of innocence favoring the
defendants. There is no need for the courts to exacerbate the plaintiff’s
already high burden with a presumption of evil that ends up forcing
them to unfairly pay more for exercising their right to be paid for their
work.
With absolutely no intention of justifying “trolling” practices, it is
worth mentioning that if “trolls” exist it is largely because of the
existence of pirates. Some commentators argue that “trolls” are now
simply looking at ways to create work, without much quality, only to
use it as bait for the pirates and to give plaintiffs standing to sue. 187 Be
that as it may, the constitutional provision granting copyright protection
does not concern itself with the intent of the author when it creates the
work, but only with whether the work meets the requirements under the
statute to obtain protection. Trolling practices must be eradicated and
should be condemned, but not at the expense of the copyright holders’
rights or the potentially harmful manipulation of FRCP 20.
6. Safeguards Against Trolling
Case law in BitTorrent cases suggests that a lot of courts have
185. Fed. R. Evid. 408.
186. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 23.
187. Id. at 21.
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approached these issues with a black and white lens. The court either
allows the plaintiff to join the defendants or, for all intents and purposes,
ends the lawsuit by forcing the plaintiff to spend significantly higher
costs to recover for damages. This Article suggests that the approach
should be more nuanced. The proper use of FRCP 20 can either allow or
deny the use of swarm joinder, depending on the plaintiff’s motive for
filing the claims and the plaintiff’s careful selection of the right
defendants and the right jurisdiction. The courts also have FRCP 21 to
exercise their discretion, using their better—but unbiased—judgment
and applying the Rules to the facts in front of them, instead of trying to
use cookie cutter solutions.
Courts can require plaintiffs to use selective criteria for the
defendants they wish to sue. These filters would narrow the number of
defendants and bring it down to a reasonable and manageable amount,
finding a happy medium between trying to sue hundreds of defendants
and having to sue each one individually. Courts can even go as far as
limiting the actual number of defendants that can be joined in each case.
If, for instance, a court states that a BitTorrent plaintiff may only seek to
join 15 defendants in any given claim, an additional burden will be
placed on the plaintiff that wants to sue 30 defendants. However, even if
the plaintiff has to split the claim in two separate claims of 15
defendants each, this is still preferable over having to file 30 individual
lawsuits.
If a plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant was carefully selected,
the court can then allow the plaintiff to draft a settlement offer that is
supervised by the court. Preventing the direct communication between
the plaintiff and the defendant can minimize the risk of coercion and
undue influence. Courts can even go as far as asking each defendant to
bring the letter they received to make sure that the plaintiff did not show
the court one letter and sent the defendant a different one. The court
could additionally restrict the plaintiff’s communication with the
defendant in regards to a particular claim in the event that the plaintiff
were to attempt to drop the defendant to avoid the supervision of the
court after obtaining the defendant’s identifying information.
A commentator suggests the use of magistrates or special masters to
help in the initial determination of whether the claims are brought in
good faith, issuing then a recommendation for the judge that can
promote judicial efficiency.188 This suggestion, coupled with selective
criteria that results in fewer defendants joined, can promote the policy
behind FRCP 20 and mitigate many of the risks that critics bring up.
Additional criteria can be added to the interpretation of FRCP 20, in

188. See generally Heinbockel, supra note 151.
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the same way that the “fundamental fairness” factors were added. One
criterion may include geographic relationship, which can preemptively
prevent jurisdictional issues. A geographic relationship requirement
would ensure that the plaintiff is trying to join defendants upon which
the court has proper jurisdiction, and not just threaten as many
defendants as possible with litigation to coerce settlements. Another
criterion may be time proximity. This criterion would ensure that
plaintiffs are truly searching for a nexus between the defendants they are
trying to join. Although plaintiffs are already grouping defendants that
interact over shorter periods of time, courts could require this nexus to
be tighter to ensure that the proper defendants are joined.
Lastly, in addition to granting legal fees to the defendants as provided
for in 17 U.S.C. § 505, the courts can also add penalties for plaintiffs
who do not follow these additional criteria or plaintiffs who repeatedly
engage in trolling practices.
7. Denial of Swarm Joinder Will Not Prevent Trolling
An absolute denial of swarm joinder does more harm than good,
because it provides pirates with a sense of security and encouragement
to continue their illegal practices, while at the same time undervaluing
the constitutionally given protection of the copyright holders.
What is even more telling of the inadequacy of using the denial of
swarm joinder as a means to address trolls, is the fact that Malibu
Media,189 one of the most active plaintiffs in copyright infringement, has
abandoned the use of swarm joinder in its lawsuits since 2013.190
Instead, Malibu Media has been filing individual lawsuits—nearly 2,000
in a span of a year and a half191—and asking for higher settlement
amounts to justify its filing costs. The fact that Malibu Media has been
found able to modify its tactic to no longer be affected by the courts’
aversion to swarm joinder is powerful evidence of two things: (1) a troll
will always find a way to be a troll, and (2) swarm joinder is not the
cause of the problem, and thus, denying it is not the solution.

189. See Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This Erotica Web Site, THE
NEW YORKER (May 14, 2014) https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-biggest-filer-ofcopyright-lawsuits-this-erotica-web-site [https://perma.cc/WM8K-LGNV] (This news article explores a
bit of the history of Malibu Media LLC. Malibu Media is a producer of pornographic and adult films
founded by Colette Pelisier Field and Brigham Field).
190. See Sag, supra note 120 at 1142.
191. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Swarm joinder may not be the perfect solution to the piracy problem.
However, it can be one that achieves the most efficient results in
deterring the uncontrollable increase in copyright infringement, at least
until the legislature and the courts are able to provide copyright holders
with a more suitable recourse. Similarly, the suggestions made in this
Article are far from ideal, but the slight probability of inconveniencing
innocent defendants on a case by case basis is far less detrimental than
hardening the interpretation of the FRCP resulting in an exception that
does not cure the illness but only treats the symptoms, and does it
poorly.
The BT Protocol and its lawful uses are a reminder of the direction in
which technology is headed. Manipulating the FRCP solely to get rid of
an incidental result of the advance of technology will not provide a longterm solution, and will only get tougher as technology progresses. With
the advance of technology, suing individual defendants with limited
financial resources is not a viable option for copyright holders to recover
for their damages. If copyright holders are not going to be able to protect
their work from illegal use, the entire purpose behind the Constitution’s
Copyright Clause, to secure original work and “promote the progress of
science and useful arts” is undermined because, without protection,
there is no longer value in creating new and better work. The curtailing
of the already limited means that copyright holders have to enforce their
constitutionally given protection is not the solution to either the piracy
or trolling problems.
It may very well be true that the high caliber of shows, such as the
Game of Thrones series, is precisely a strong pull factor that attracts
pirates who wish to enjoy these shows without having to pay the
subscription fees to watch them. This tempting factor in no way justifies
partaking in piracy practices, and until the legislature is able to enact
laws that better protect copyright holders and innocent defendants, it is
up to the courts to ensure justice is carried. However, the undue
manipulation of FRCP 20 presents more problems than solutions and
erodes the explicit flexibility and efficiency purpose behind the Rule.
The denial of swarm joinder, allowing pirates to enjoy unencumbered
illegal access to protected works at the expense of the rights of copyright
holders and the integrity of the FRCP, is not only to witness the tail wag
the dog but to also muzzle the dog for protesting to the wagging.
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